Anti-Takeover strategies

Anti-Takeover strategies

Anti-Takeover Measure' Measures taken on a continual or sporadic basis by a firm's management in order to prevent or deter unwanted takeovers.

Golden Handcuffs

Golden handcuffs are financial incentives designed to keep talented employees from leaving a company. Golden handcuffs can take several forms.
 For example, golden handcuffs may entail deferred compensation, under which pay for past services are postponed to some future date. Golden handcuffs can also involve stock options, which the executive cannot exercise until after some length of service to the firm. Another form of golden handcuffs is restricted stock, which is transferred to the executive but remains subject to forfeiture if the manager leaves the firm at an early date, or does not reach certain performance goals.
Golden handcuffs are also sometimes part of an anti-takeover strategy adopted in mergers and acquisitions. Under this golden handcuffs scenario, key staff immediately become vested in stock options once the company is taken over. With their golden handcuffs thus removed, many key executives will want to quit the firm, leaving the new owners without the experienced talent they need to run the company. This unlocking of golden handcuffs serves as a poison pill to discourage takeover attempts.

How it works (Example):

Golden handcuffs may come in the form of lucrative commissions, generous bonuses, employee stock options, or other financial compensation; all provided to a talented employee as an incentive to keep them from moving out of the company.
For example, let's assume that John is the CFO of Company XYZ. John is very talented and capable, and Company XYZ knows that it would be very time-consuming and expensive to hire a new CFO if John were to leave. 
The labor market for CFOs is very tight at the moment, meaning that John has a lot of options at other companies and is probably getting some interest from other firms.
To keep John at Company XYZ, the board of directors decides to give him some golden handcuffs: a $50,000 stay bonus that he must return if he leaves the company in the next 18 months. John is actually free to leave at any time, but if he does, he won't get to keep the $50,000.

Why it Matters:

Golden handcuffs are a tactic to retain talent. They are more common in tight labor markets or for jobs requiring highly specialized skills. However, they are also very expensive, and although they can be less expensive than the cost to replace a particular employee, golden handcuffs often receive scrutiny from shareholders and directors.

Impacts

When offered, golden handcuffs are extremely tempting as they usually are of great value compared to the employee's annual salary. The experience that follows an agreement of this sort may be draining and abhorrent, which is why the contract must be thoroughly analysed and thought about until an intelligent conclusion or compensation, that benefits both the company and the employee, is agreed upon. Often employees feel the urge to remain within the company they've been working with, even though it may not seem like the smartest choice, objectively, because of tradition, relationships or a simple feeling of belonging. When different opportunities are offered to an employee, generally the choice is made by a mix of objective and subjective views, where he or she must prioritise every aspect of their opportunities in order to result with a beneficial solution. These sort of agreements might potentially impose penalties if the employee decides to leave the company before the contracted date, such as the repayment of bonuses. Often included in these contracts are non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), where the employee is prohibited to communicate sensitive corporate information, and non-compete clauses, where working for competitors is forbidden for the leaving employee.

Structure

Top talent is usually quite rare, so companies often negotiate deals in order to hold on to key employees. Golden handcuffs constitute one of several ways to stop companies' key employees leaving, making it essentially financially unprofitable for them to walk away from their employers. Such deals are usually done with stock options, phantom stock or deferred payments. Phantom stock usually gives the best results, as it gives an employee of a company using the technique a motive for staying with the company and making it grow, since the stock increases in value alongside the company. To create a contract that benefits both the employee and the company, a legal team should be contacted in order to discuss available options, and key employees should be distinguished from others.A funding mechanism should be put in place by the company (if privately held), where obligations are present. Tax repercussions should be minimised for the money set aside, usually using insurance as main funding mechanism. If designed perfectly, the corporation can manage to receive all its money back after paying the employee.
                                                          
 Golden parachutes

The Golden Parachute is an agreement between the company and the top executive(s), that he will be paid lucrative benefits in the event when a company is taken over by the other firm, and his employment gets terminated, as a consequence of merger or acquisition.
In other words, golden parachute is a clause in the employment contract, generally of top key executives, that employee will receive certain significant benefits as an inducement for early employment termination from the company due to a takeover. Benefits given to the employees include stock options, severance pay, cash bonuses or other benefits.
The golden parachute is a disputed concept. Supporters believe that this clause helps in hiring or retaining the top level executives, due to the lucrative benefits attached to it. These benefits enable an individual to remain objective in the firm, in case a firm is involved in a merger or takeover activities.
Also, the golden parachute contracts can be used as an anti-takeover measure taken by the company to discourage the takeover or a merger by any other firm, due to the huge cost associated with these contracts.
But however, opponents believe that it is the legal duty of every employee (including top executives) to act in the best interest of the company and, therefore, should not be given additional benefits to remain objective and perform activities that are advantageous for the company. Also, the top executives are already paid handsome salaries and should not be given any extra benefits in case of their early termination from the company.

Golden parachutes are contracts given to key executives and can be used as a type of anti-takeover measure, often collectively referred to as poison pills, taken by a firm to discourage an unwanted takeover attempt. Benefits may include stock options, cash bonuses and generous severance pay.
A golden parachute consists of substantial benefits given to top executives if the company is taken over by another firm and the executives are terminated as a result of the merger or takeover. Golden parachutes are contracts given to key executives and can be used as a type of anti-takeover measure, often collectively referred to as poison pills, taken by a firm to discourage an unwanted takeover attempt. Benefits may include stock options, cash bonuses and generous severance pay.

Golden parachute clauses can be used to define the
lucrative benefits that an employee would receive if he is terminated. The term often relates to the terminations that result from a takeover or merger.
Poison pill

A poison pill is a tactic utilized by companies to prevent or discourage hostile takeovers. A company targeted for a takeover uses a poison pill strategy to make shares of the company’s stock look unattractive or less desirable to the acquiring firm.
There are two types of poison pills:
1. A “flip-in” permits shareholders, except for the acquirer, to purchase additional shares at a discount. This provides investors with instantaneous profits. Using this type of poison pill also dilutes shares held by the acquiring company, making the takeover attempt more expensive and more difficult.
2. A “flip-over” enables stockholders to purchase the acquirer’s shares after the merger at a discounted rate. For example, a shareholder may gain the right to buy the stock of its acquirer, in subsequent mergers, at a two-for-one rate.

BREAKING DOWN 'Poison Pill'

The term poison pill is the common colloquial expression referring to a specially designed shareholder rights plan. A defensive tactic enacted by a company’s board of directors, poison pills, at least, cause an aggressive takeover plot to be rethought. At most, a poison pill may deter a takeover altogether.

History and Functionality

In regard to mergers and acquisitions, poison pills were initially constructed in the early 1980s. They were devised as a way to stop bidding takeover companies from directly negotiating a price for the sale of shares with shareholders and instead force bidders to negotiate with the board of directors.
Shareholder rights plans are typically issued by the board of directors in the form of a warrant or an option attached to existing shares. These plans, or poison pills, can only be revoked by the board. Since their inception, poison pills have formulated into two types with the flip-in variety being the most common.

An Example

Flip-in poison pills may hold an attached option that permits shareholders to buy additional discounted shares if any one shareholder buys more than a certain percentage, or more, of the company’s shares.
For example, a flip-in poison pill plan is triggered when a shareholder buys 25% of the company’s shares. When it is triggered, every shareholder, minus the holder who purchased 25%, is entitled to buy a new issue of shares at a discounted rate. The greater the number of shareholders who buy additional shares, the more diluted the bidder’s interest becomes and the higher the cost of the bid. If a bidder is aware such a plan could be activated, it may be inclined not to pursue a takeover without board approval.


THE NET EFFECTS OF POISON
PILL STRATEGIES

The net effect of a poison pill strategy is to make it prohibitively expensive for an acquirer to buy the control of a company. The underlying assumption is that the board will always act in the best interest of the shareholders, a view that is explicitly rejected by agency theorists. Agency theorists have argued that the practice of allowing management to adopt poison pill strategy has reduced the number of potential offers and actual takeovers. In doing so, they have protected incumbent management at the expense of shareholders. It is argued that poison pills have the effect of perpetuating inefficiencies and poor management that ultimately is reflected in lower stock values.
Boards of directors invariably argue that poison pill strategies have exactly the opposite effect on stock values. They help maintain their independent decision making power to run their companies in the best interests of the shareholders. Poison pill strategies also provide bargaining strength to the board in order to extract the most value for the stock from a potential acquirer.
While there are merits to the arguments on both sides, an efficient allocation of resources through merger and acquisition activities can only enhance shareholders' wealth no matter how hostile the tender offers of corporate raiders. Many of the defensive tactics of management should be opposed by the shareholders as they might cause a loss of their wealth, although other defensive actions-for example, by soliciting competitive bids-can increase their wealth.

'White Knight'

A white knight is an individual or company that acquires a corporation on the verge of being taken over by a force deemed undesirable by company officials, otherwise known as a black knight. While the target company doesn't remain independent, a white knight is viewed as a preferred option to the hostile company completing their takeover. Unlike a hostile takeover, current management typically remains in place in a white knight scenario, and investors receive better compensation for their shares.

BREAKING DOWN 'White Knight'

The white knight is the savior of a company in the middle of a hostile takeover. Often, company officials seek out a white knight – sometimes to preserve the company's core business, and other times just to negotiate better takeover terms.
An example of the former can be seen in the movie "Pretty Woman" when corporate raider/black knight Edward Lewis, played by Richard Gere, has a change of heart and decides to work with the head of a company he'd originally planned on ransacking.
Billionaire Patrick Soon-Shiong has been deemed as a white knight for his $70.5 million investment in May 2016 into Tribune Publishing, a newspaper company that is currently fending off a takeover attempt by Gannett Co., the United States' largest newspaper company by daily circulation. Soon-Shiong's investment makes him Tribune Publishing's second-largest shareholder.

Hostile Takeovers

A few of the most hostile takeover situations include AOL's $164 billion purchase of Time Warner in 2000, Sanofi-Aventis' $24.5 billion purchase of biotech company Genzyme in 2010, Deutsche Borse AG's blocked $17 billion merger with NYSE Euronext in 2011 and Clorox's rejection of Carl Icahn's $11.7 billion takeover bid in 2011.
Successful hostile takeovers, however, are rare; not a single takeover of an unwilling target has amounted to more than $10 billion in value since 2000. Most of the time, an acquiring company raises the price per share it is offering until shareholders and board members of the targeted company are satisfied. It is especially hard to purchase a large company that does not want to be sold. Mylan, a global leader in generic drugs, experienced this when it attempted to purchase Perrigo, the world's largest producer of drugstore-brand products, for $26 billion in 2015, but it was turned down. A company such as Perrigo does not need the help of a white knight when put into a hostile situation.
In addition to white knights and black knights, there is a third potential takeover candidate called a gray knight. A gray knight is not as desirable as a white knight, but it is more desirable than a black knight.